ABSTRACT This paper considers the problem of renewable energy allocation for a cellular backhaul network where each backhaul node can request renewable energy from a microgrid to forward the traffic. Each microgrid includes multiple renewable power suppliers (RPSs), which directly compete with each other to be the sole supplier of the node. The operator needs to specify the energy storage level for each RPS along the backhaul and the wireless service price for the end users. Then, the RPSs will determine their individual energy prices. The problem is formulated as a Stackelberg game between the leader (the wireless operator) and multiple followers (RPSs). We will identify the RPSs' unique equilibrium pricing scheme as well as the operator's optimal energy storage and wireless service price decisions. Our analysis also provides the important observation that direct competition between RPSs on the same backhaul node will induce the operator to store more energy and can thus improve the revenues of both the operator and the RPSs. Furthermore, we consider that RPSs along the backhaul may form coalitions to better coordinate their pricing decisions when they sell energy to the wireless operator. Such a study leads to a hybrid twolevel game whose the first level is similar to the Stackelberg game for the non-cooperative scenario. We will show that a coalition formation depends crucially on how the wireless traffic will be affected by the energy price reduction due to the coalition formation. In a nutshell, the proposed techniques provide insights for operating a green cellular backhaul by using the distribute energy sources in a decentralized market setting. Finally, simulation results are presented to compare the solutions of the competitive model with those of the cooperative model. We show that forming coalitions between RPSs benefits both the RPSs and the operator.
I. INTRODUCTION
The past few decades have witnessed tremendous growth in the development of wireless networks, resulting in a significant increase in the energy consumption by both the wireless operator and end users [1] , [2] . According to [3] , mobile traffic was expected to increase many times in recent years, which contrasts with network capacity not growing in the same proportion; meanwhile, the consumption of conventional energy, such as from coal and oil, will increase CO 2 emissions. Various energy harvesting techniques, e.g., radio frequency (RF) energy harvesting, have attracted lots of interest toward establishing green networks. Meanwhile, as distributed energy generation and storage technologies are becoming economically viable with the continued deployment of the smart grid, renewable energies (e.g., solar and wind) have been widely used to deploy green networks [4] , [5] .
The cellular backhaul is regarded as one of the key technologies of future 5G systems for supporting huge highspeed data transmissions over dense small-cell networks [6] . Specifically, the FCC is encouraging operators and OEMs to develop and deploy 60 GHz lower-cost backhaul products that will, in turn, significantly reduce the disruption and capital expenditures per small cell [7] . The multi-hop cellular backhaul are now viewed as the possible future alternatives to fiber-optic small-cell links [8] - [12] . Hence, a significant amount of traffic will be forwarded via high speed mmWave backhaul links, and a large amount of energy will be consumed at the backhaul. The work [13] and [14] study the issues of stable traditional energy resource allocation for cellular backhaul networks, but, did not explore the renewable energy sources.
The renewable-powered cellular systems has emerged as a crucial issue for future sustainable mobile networks, since it can be much cheaper and more environmentally friendly than conventional energy resources [15] . The work [16] and [17] optimizes the energy purchases based on the time-varying wireless traffic load in order to minimize electricity bills. In [18] , the authors proposed a network utility aware (NUA) traffic load balancing scheme to optimize the user association, reaching a tradeoff between green power utilization and traffic delivery latency. Accounting for the intrinsic variability of renewable energy sources, the time-horizon optimization problems are formulated to optimize the downlink beam forming [19] or the MIMO downlink throughput [20] . Meanwhile, the smart grids and new interoperable functionalities, such as real-time energy trading, are of particular interest regarding the improvement of productivity of future mobile systems [21] - [26] . Although interesting, the above body of schemes cannot be applied to multi-hop cellular backhaul networks since the energy allocation for every node along the backhaul should be optimized in a joint manner, and the QoS of the backhaul will depend on the action of every node.
The work [27] studies the renewable energy allocation over a multi-hop cellular backhaul network whereby the operator determines its energy pricing strategy to use energy from renewable power suppliers for each backhaul node. However, this work does not consider price-sensitive mobile users, in other words, the traffic demand is assumed to fellow a certain distribution and thus is not related to the pricing strategy of the operator. As a result, the scenario studied in this paper is completely different from [27] . In fact, the pricedriven dynamic spectrum accessing has already been considered as a promising paradigm for future cognitive radio networks [28] . Additionally, demand response management where users adapt their demands to maximize their own utility based on the price information, has also been investigated extensively for smart grids [29] , [30] . To the best of our knowledge, designing the renewable-powered multi-hop cellular backhaul with price-driven traffic, as addressed in this paper, remains an open problem.
A. CONTRIBUTIONS
The main contribution of this paper is to investigate a green cellular backhaul system powered by distributed micro grids and consider the price-sensitive end users. Each backhaul node is supplied by a micro grid which consists of multiple RPSs. So that, the system include: (1) the direct competition each supplier faces in the same micro grid, (2) the indirect competition among the RPSs along the backhaul nodes, and (3) the vertical interaction between the wireless operator and the RPSs. The RPSs need to decide individual energy price by accounting for the competition both from the same backhaul node and other nodes on the backhaul. Based on the energy price, the operator will charge a service price for end uses and store the renewable energy at each backhaul node. We study such a system by using a two-stage Stackelberg game formulation.
For the formulated game, we first characterize the equilibrium energy pricing strategies of the RPSs who act as the followers. We prove that there always exists a unique Nash equilibrium (NE) solution for the followers game. Subsequently, the operator/leader can characterize the optimal wireless service pricing and energy storage strategies, based on the unique NE strategy of the followers game. The result shows that the direct competition that one RPS faces helps improve the performance of the operator and all the other RPSs in the system, and surprisingly, it can help improve the performance of this particular RPS facing the competition as well. We further consider that RPSs along the backhaul may form coalitions to better coordinate their pricing decisions when they sell energy to the wireless operator. This investigation leads to a two-level hybrid game where the second level is a coalition game, and, the first level game is similar to the formulated Stackelberg game. By using the obtained result in the non-cooperative case, we will prove that RPSs always prefer selling energy in coalitions along the backhaul network and that there exists a unique Nash stable coalition structure. Finally, we compare the competitive solution with the cooperative solution through numerical results. Part of this work has been presented in the conference [43] .
B. RELATED WORK
For the multi-hop cellular backhaul, the authors in [8] present a path-protection strategy to balance backhaul traffic among small BSs and minimize the fluctuations incurred by rerouting. A matching problem is formulated in [9] to investigates traffic-oriented resource allocation for mm) multi-hop backhaul networks The authors in [10] propose a framework to enable the small base stations to jointly decide on forming the multi-hop, mmW links over backhaul infrastructure that belongs to multiple, independent MNOs. The authors in [11] present a traffic load and link-quality aware multi-hop relay VOLUME 6, 2018 backhaul scheduling algorithm to maximize the overall performance. The work [12] investigates the backhaul wireless link performance modeling approach to consider its inherent line-of-sight nature, together with an appropriate representation of the network topology using stochastic geometry. Nevertheless, none of above work studied the issues of using the renewable energy over the multi-hop cellular backhaul.
Renewable energy sources are often limited in terms of generation capacity and can also have a random output, thus, energy storage management is needed for the efficient exploitation of renewable sources [22] . In [23] , the authors considered the interference elimination problem of secondary heterogeneous cellular system macro cells and small cells, which are based on unstable energy sources. An energy management framework is formulated in [24] to determine the amount of conventional and renewable energy to be exchanged among BSs with certain battery capacities and considering real-time energy pricing where the renewable energy generation is unknown, perfectly known, and partially known ahead of time. The QoS degradation cost and the QoS tradeoff for hybrid energy supply networks is studied in [21] . An analytical framework is developed in [25] to obtain stochastic properties, i.e., association probabilities, and coverage probabilities, for renewable-powered smell cells. The authors in [26] presents an outage-aware power allocation scheme for a two-way communication system between a renewable-powered small base station and user equipment (UE). However, such works are often focused on the radio access and not on the backhaul.
With the deployment of smart grids, energy trading has also gradually become a profit-making option for energy users. The work [29] and [30] study the demand response management where energy users can adapt their demands based on the energy price information. On the other hand, the Stackelberg games are extensively studied to model the market behaviors between users and resource owners [31] , [32] . To enable the sharing of spectrum and network elements, the authors in [33] introduce a coalitional game model to identify the cooperative strategies among operators to provide service to a given area. A bankruptcy game model is studied in [34] to allocate the obtained operation cost among different operators, each of whom is the owner of a HetNet, and the Shapley value is used to portray each MNO's contribution to the cost savings. This paper will propose a new two-level hybrid game jointly modeling the Stackelberg and coalitional dynamics over the green multi-hop cellular backhaul.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section II describes the system model. Section III formulates problems for the non-cooperation scenario and cooperation scenario, respectively. Section IV analyzes the non-cooperation scenario and the unique Stackelberg solution of the game. Section V studies the cooperative behaviors between RPSs and identifies the stable coalition structure. We then provide numerical results and discussion in Section VI. Section VII concludes the paper. 
II. NETWORK MODEL A. RENEWABLE-POWERED BACKHAUL NETWORK
The cellular backhaul/fraonthaul is the high-capacity shortrange backhaul alternative to connect wireless broadband networks and for other wireless applications. The backhual nodes can be integrated with the small base stations or be the independent microwave radio equipments such as NEC's Pasolink [7] . Now, let us consider a heterogeneous network wherein a SBS is connected to the core network to forward the uplink or downlink data traffic through a cellular wireless backhaul.
The wireless backhaul is supposed to use multihop mmW communication links in our model, and those n hops of the backhaul nodes are indexed sequentially by = {θ 1 , · · · , θ n }. 1 Each backhaul node is connected to a micro grid which has some renewable energy suppliers, thus, will use the renewable energy from the micro grid. For each backhaul node, the RPS with the minimum cost in the micro grid will be the sole energy supplier. Denote RPS i, i {1, · · · , n}, as the renewable energy supplier to node θ i . Letc i be the energy storage cost of RPS i. The direct competitor of RPS i in the same micro grid is denoted as RPSî, which stores the energy at a cost ofĉ i . The cost differenceĉ i −c i measures the intensity of the direct competition faced by RPS i; the direct competition becomes more intense as the cost difference becomes smaller.
We label the n RPSs in decreasing order of the direct competition intensities such thatĉ 1 − c 1 ≤ĉ 2 − c 2 ≤ · · · ≤ c n − c n . The system is shown in Fig. 1 .
B. THE PATH LOSS AND WIRELESS TRAFFIC MODEL
Let P i be the transmission power, and let h i be the hop distance of node θ i . We assume that echo hop transmission over the backhaul follows the free-space propagation model [6] . According to Friis' law, the path loss can be expressed in dB as follows:
L(h) = 32.5 + 20 log 10 (f ) + 10γ log 10 (h) + A × h, (1) 1 In this paper, we consider one data stream along the backhaul. For multiple data streams, the proposed scheme can be applied to each data stream independently. The considered system in which the n-hop renewable-powered backhaul forwards the data traffic to the gateway or macro base station. This paper mainly focuses the renewable energy storage allocation and pricing. In practical, when the storage is empty, the nodes can switch to conventional stable sources again.
where f is the carrier frequency, γ stands for the path loss exponent, h indicates the link distance, and A is the oxygenand-rain attenuation coefficient.
Assume that the delivery of one unit of traffic along the backhaul has a certain rate of R for the random traffic amount D(p). The end users will generate more data traffic when the operator's service pricep is lower, which will thus make the operator request more energy from each RPS. In addition, it is reasonable to assume that more traffic will be generated when the data stream rate R increases. We use an exponential function, D(p) , to capture the price sensitivity and uncertainty of the traffic demand:
where ε is a random variable indicating the uncertainty of the traffic demand of end users. This exponential expression is similar to the Cobb-Douglas demand curves that are commonly used in both economics and networks [35] . In addition, lower service prices and high data stream rates will induce end users to generate more data traffic; thus, such a demand function obeys the following restrictions:
This restriction implies that lower service prices and high data stream rates will induce end users to generate more data traffic. The path loss is assumed to follow the free-space propagation model. For backhaul node θ i , the corresponding pass loss isL(h i ). Let P i be the transmit power of backhaul node θ i needed to maintain the date rate R, and B is an auxiliary function used to simplify the expression. Then, we obtain
where B is the backhaul bandwidth. Let
while the energy demandẼ i is
In other words, delivering one unit of traffic at node θ i with a rate of R will consume the energy w i represents the total energy cost for forwarding one unit of data traffic through the backhaul. Define W −i = W \ w i . Assume that the operator sets the pricep of one unit of wireless traffic for the end users. Then, the operator's profit function can be expressed as
Then, the problem for the operator of choosing a price p and the traffic amount q to be served by renewable energy, is equivalent to choosing a price p and a factor z. As a result, the above function can be rewritten as,
where
Note that, the traffic amount q determines the energy storage requirement of each RPS. In this paper, we consider the case wherein the random factor ε follows a uniform distribution on [0, B]. Then, we have
On the other hand, n RPSs will simultaneously choose their individual energy prices to obtain their individual payoffs.
Proposition 1: Given a certain pricing strategy vector
. The above interactions lead to a Stackelberg leaderfollowers game in which the players are the wireless operator and the RPSs, the strategy of the operator is the pricing scheme p and the traffic amount q, the strategy of RPS i is the energy price w i , and the utility functions of the operator and RPSs are given by (7) and (8), respectively, as shown in Fig. 2 . In this game, the operator, acting as the leader, will choose it VOLUME 6, 2018 FIGURE 2. Two-stage backward analysis for the game. The traffic amount q identified by the operator, will determine the energy storage requirement of each RPS.
strategies to optimize its expected profit (7) . The RPSs, acting as the followers, then simultaneously choose storage levels S to optimize their individual profit (8) .
To solve the proposed Stackelberg game and find its equilibrium, we will use the backward induction. We first identify the followers game, where the RPSs chooses their individual energy prices. Specifically, the Nash equilibrium of the followers game is defined in the following.
Definition 1: For the followers game, the strategy
). We will prove that the followers game has a unique Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium solution. Then, in the leader game, the wireless operator is about to determine its wireless service price p and the intended traffic amount q served by the renewable energy by anticipating the result of the followers game. Finally, the obtained solutions in two stages construct a Stackelberg equilibrium, which will enable us to understand how to operate the green cellular backhaul with separate micro grids in a decentralized market.
B. COOPERATIVE SCENARIO
In the cooperative scenario, the individual RPS on each node can form alliances with one another to coordinate their energy pricing strategy. The RPSs in an alliance will use the same pricing strategy. Mobile traffic demand is also deterministic and is sensitive to the operator's service price. We define A = {A 1 , · · · , A m } as an alliance structure, where
and N = {1, · · · , n} denotes the set of RPSs. We use W A j = (w i : i A j ) to express the alliances' renewable energy price of A j A and C A j = (c i : i A j ) to express the cost of alliance A j A. Q represents the traffic amount to be served by the renewable energy.
Given an alliance structure A = {A 1 , · · · , A m } and an alliance energy price vector {W A 1 , · · · , W A m }, the operator's profit function o can be expressed as
and the profit function of alliance A j , A j , is
where E A j denotes the energy demand of the alliance and
A j is a mapping relationship that represents the free path loss of the alliance. We consider a two-level hybrid game model for the above interaction between the operator and RPS coalitions.
The first level/leve I game is also a Stackelberg game where the operator is the Stackelberg leader whose strategies is to determine the pricing schemep and the traffic amount Q to optimize its profit in (9), then, each coalition A j decides the strategy of the energy price W A j as a follower to maximize the coalition's profit in (10) . As a result, the Nash equilibrium of the followers game in level I is defined as, Definition 2: Given the certain strategies of the operator and the coalition structure, the strategy W * = {W *
The second level/level II game is concerned with the alliance/coalition formation game among RPSs, where the strategy for coalition A j is the energy price W A j and the utility function for each coalition is defined in (10) . The RPSs in a coalition will share the profit of each coalition according to a rule. The result of the coalition formation game in the second level is defined as a Nash stable structure.
Definition 3: Nash stable structures consist of all coalition structures in which no RPS has a strictly profitable and feasible deviation.
We will propose an algorithm to find the unique Nash stable structure in level II. Then, based on the obtained coalition structure in level II, we analyze the level I game by using the similar analysis method in the non-cooperative scenario. Finally, the obtained solutions stages construct a Stackelberg equilibrium of the two-level hybrid game, which can enable the stable and cooperation operation of the distributed micro grids for the green cellular backhaul system.
IV. ANALYSIS FOR THE NON-COOPERATIVE SCENARIO
In this section, we first characterize the unique equilibrium pricing strategies of the n RPSs, given fixed strategies of the operator. The following proposition characterizes the response function for each RPS in the RPS game. Then, Theorem 1 presents the Nash solution of the game.
Proposition 2: Given the RPSs' energy price vector W −i , the profit function i (w i |W −i ) is quasi-convex and has the maximum value of,
Proposition 2 shows that an individual RPS's price increase depends on its own cost, the other RPSs' prices, and the operator's cost. Thus, the equilibrium solution of the RPSs' pricing game can be found by solving the n equations in (10) . Specifically, we design Algorithm 1 to find the pricing scheme that maximizes the RPS's expected profit. Algorithm 1 first calculates the difference between the RPS's cost and its direct competitor's cost from the first backhaul node, and then, compares that value to the best response of that RPS. If the difference is less than the best response, the algorithm goes to the next node to calculate the difference. The algorithm proceeds iteratively in this manner until the difference is no less than the best response of a certain node. Theorem 1: The RPSs' pricing game has the unique Nash equilibrium
In this equation
To understand the meaning of the unique equilibrium expressed by w * i , we show how the n RPSs indirectly influence each other through their individual choices of energy prices. A price increase by any of the RPSs will lead the operator to reduce the ordered energy quantity from all the RPSs. Let k [1, n + 1]. In equilibrium, the profit margins of the RPSs in formula (8) can be expressed as follows:
Then, we obtain the following result. Proposition 3: As the direct competition faced by RPS i becomes intense (ĉ i decreases), the profit of any other RPS j, j = i, increases. In addition, the profit of RPS i may first increase but will eventually decrease and will be close to zero asĉ i becomes close toc i .
To obtain the RPS's storage level and operator's service price, we use the following equation,
w * i is the summation of each RPS's equilibrium energy price. Then, substituting (12) into (18) and (14), we will obtain the operator's optimal strategy (p * ,q * ) as follows:
V. ANALYSIS FOR THE COOPERATIVE SCENARIO
In this section, we will show that the RPSs on a backhaul will eventually benefit from forming coalitions, by accounting for a trade-off between the increasing in traffic demand and the decrease in energy price. Let {W A 1 , · · · , W A m } be an energy price vector that corresponds to the coalition structure A and W = m j=1 W A j . We start with the analysis of the problems in level II.
A. ANALYSIS OF THE ALLIANCE FORMATION FOR LEVEL II
We next characterize the necessary and sufficient conditions under which a given coalition structure is Nash stable. Toward this end, we first need to identify how RPSs in the same coalition will split the coalitional profit among themselves. A classical way to allocate the gains from cooperation among players is the Shapley value [36] . The Shapley value is a solution concept to distribute the total gains to the players in cooperative game theory; by considering the contribution made by each agent, the benefits of cooperation should be distributed fairly. It assigns a unique distribution of the total revenue generated by the alliance of all players by considering the average amount of expected contribution from
VOLUME 6, 2018 the collaborative scheme. In our model, by considering the contribution made by each RPS, the total revenue generated from the cooperation of RPSs should be distributed fairly in an alliance. In this paper, we use the Shapley value as the fairest allocation scheme for the collective gains in a coalition. Specifically, the Shapley value assigns a unique value φ i (v A j ) to an RPS i, i A j , which represents the average amount of expected contribution from the collaborative scheme. We present the expression in equation (15) shown at the bottom of the previous page, where Z represents the subset of A j . Proposition 4: Given an alliance structure A = {A 1 , · · · , A m }, we denote A j as the number of RPSs in alliance A j , and U(m) = (m) (m+1) . If this alliance has any independent RPSs, it will be a Nash stable alliance only if U(m−1) ≤ A 2 +1; if it has any non-independent RPSs, this alliance will be a Nash stable alliance only if U(m) ≥ A m .
Definition 4: For expression simplicity, we define
Theorem 2: Algorithm 2 enables the RPS alliance formation process to converge to the unique Nash stable structure, A (1)(2) or A (2)(2) , for odd or even n, respectively. 
Algorithm 2 Proposed Distributed
case A i is independent: 9: if U (m) ||A 2 || + 1, 10: then, i will not defect, 11: else, i will join any other alliance, 12: break; 13: case A i is non-independent: 14: if U (m) ||A m ||, 15: then, i will not defect, 16: else, i will join any other alliance, 17: break; } 18: output: The above phases are repeated until each alliance has specified an alliance energy price and formed stable alliance structures. (2) is stable for any even n.
B. ANALYSIS FOR THE EQUILIBRIUM SOLUTION IN LEVEL I
Taking each coalition as a single player, the analysis is similar to the techniques used for the competitive scenario. Thus, we can directly conclude that there is a unique Nash Equilibrium for the coalition energy pricing game. To identify the optimal strategy of the operator, we first show that all alliances obtain equal profits in the unique Nash equilibrium. Subsequently, the following proposition characterizes the optimal strategies of the operator based on the unique NE solution of the coalition followers game.
Proposition 5: For a given RPS alliance structure, all alliances obtain equal profit in the unique Nash equilibrium.
Basically, the reason for equal profits for all alliances is that all backhaul nodes will forward the same amount of wireless traffic. Moreover, recall that the wireless traffic demand function can be expressed as D(p) = εe −R −1p . Here, we define η(p) = −pD (p) D(p) =p R , which implies the curvature property of D(p). Since Proposition 4 states that the profit of an alliance under the NE in followers game is only related to the number of RPS alliances along the backhaul, we denote (m) = A j . Subsequently, the operator can determine its service price (p * ).
Proposition 6: Given A = {A 1 , · · · , A m } with demand function D(p), we have the following results:
. From result (3) of Proposition 6, we find that the coalition formation process will make each RPS have a higher surplus than with RPSs acting independently in the non-cooperative scenario. This is because the operator will reduce the wireless service price, as shown in (2) of Proposition 6. In addition, result (4) implies that reducing the service price will induce the end users to access more data traffic, thereby bringing greater profit to the operator.
C. THE SYSTEM CENTRALIZED OPTIMAL SOLUTION
In this subsection, we examine the system centralized optimal solution, where it is assumed that the backhaul network and RPSs belong to a single company/operator. Let c denote the expected total profit for any chosenp and data amount q.
We have
where q i denotes the energy storage quantity of each RPS. By substituting q = zy(p) into (16), the function can be rewritten as
We find the optimal pricep that satisfies the first-order condition
Then, we find the optimal Z * that satisfies
Thus,
substituting (17) into (16), we will obtain the optimal system profit. In the following section, we will analyze the performance of the proposed decentralized scheme and compare the decentralized solution with the centralized solution.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS A. PARAMETER SETTING
A report from an independent national carbon footprint research group shows that the conventional energy price could be between 6 cents/kWh and 40 cents/kWh worldwide [41] . On the other hand, a green pricing utility program from the US department of energy shows that prices of different renewable power suppliers vary from approximately 0.5 cents/kWh to 5.0 cents/kWh [42] . Thus, in the simulation, the renewable energy cost is set randomly between 0.5 cents/kWh and 4.5 cents/kWh for renewable energy, and electric energy is set at 30 cents/kWh. We set the backhaul distance to random values between 80 m and 150 m. Thus, the distance between a small BS located at the edge and the macro BS will be approximately 1 km in city and urban areas. The operating cost of the operator c 0 is 1 cent. For the path loss functionL los (h), we set γ = 2.2 and the value of A to 16 dB/km in (1), which correspond to the urban street model. In the simulations, we set the backhaul wireless link frequency to 60 GHz, 2 and one unit of traffic is set to 1 Gbit.
We assume each RPS's output to be a random value which is related to the storage cost, i.e., a large value will result in a small storage cost. The storage cost will impact the energy pricing strategy. Fig. 3 is plotted to verify the equilibrium strategy of the RPS pricing game. We first take RPS 1 as an example. We set the cost c 1 = 0.8 cents, and its direct competitor's energy pricê c 1 = 1.1 cents. When other RPSs fix their equilibrium pricing strategies, RPS 1 achieves its maximal profit at the equilibrium point, i.e., w * i = 1. This means that RPS 1 cannot change its strategy unilaterally at the equilibrium state. As shown in the figure, the same equilibrium property can also be found for RPSs 3 and 5. We then analyze the algorithm proposed to find the equilibrium pricing solution. Fig. 4 shows the average number of iterations for the convergence of Algorithm 1. We can observe from the figure that the average number of iterations only increases from approximately 3 to 25 as the number VOLUME 6, 2018 of backhaul hops increases from 6 to 30. In other words, the complexity of the proposed algorithm is O(n), where n is the number of backhaul nodes. In practice, the time needed for the algorithm to obtain the solution is related to not only the complexity of the algorithm but also the hardware device. Fig. 5a ) and Fig. 5b ) show the energy storage levels of RPSs for a 10-hop backhaul. 3 The total length of the backhaul is set to 1 km and 10 backhaul nodes are randomly placed along the backhaul. The total traffic amount is set to 720 Gbits with = 1. Recall that we have labeled the RPSs according to their energy costs of forwarding one unit of traffic. To compute the storage levels, we first obtain the Stackelberg equilibrium strategies for both the operator and the RPSs. Then, we use equation (13) to obtain the storages for each RPS. For instance, we can find that the operator decision for the energy storage of RPS 1 is 50.7 kWh.
B. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS FOR THE NON-COOPERATIVE SCENARIO 1) EQUILIBRIUM SOLUTION ANALYSIS

2) IMPACT OF THE DATA RATE AND WIRELESS TRAFFIC
We can observe from Fig. 5a ) that the energy storage level increases with increasing RPS ID. This is because we set in the simulation that a smaller RPS ID corresponds to a smaller hop distance; thus, a lower storage level is required with a lower path loss factor. In addition, with a larger data rate of the backhaul, more energy will be demanded for each backhaul node. Fig. 5b) shows the operator's energy demand from each RPS with different wireless traffic amounts. A larger implies a larger amount of traffic. = 3 and = 5 correspond to the traffic amounts of 720×3 and 720×5 Gbits, respectively. Fig.5b) shows that the operator's energy demand quantity from each RPS also increases with increasing 3 The 60GHz band can be used to link devices over a distance of up to 12 meters for IEEE 802.11ad [37] , or to provide wireless broadband network connectivity over distances up to a mile according to FCC [7] . Here, we consider a short transmission of the backhaul hop, i.e., about 100 meters. For example, for 4G systems with 2.6 GHz frequency bands, cell sizes will be about 1 km in city and urban areas [38] . Thus, a small bast station placed at the edge of the cell needs about 10 hops to forward the traffic to the macro station.
wireless traffic amount. Fig. 5c ) plots the RPS's profit with different data rates. When the data rate is set to 100, 150 and 200 Mbits/s, all the RPSs' profits increase significantly. This means that each RPS can earn more profit when the data rate is relatively high.
3) ANALYSIS OF THE DIRECT COMPETITION IN A MICRO GRID
We then denote We observe from the figure that the direct competition that RPSs faces helps improve the profit all RPSs in the system. For instance, RPS 2 will gain 0.9 − 0.8 = 0.1 kcents/unit more profit than the situation without direct competition. In order to further show the impact of the direct competition on the system performance, we vary the direct competition intensity of RPS 5 and fix the direct competition intensities of the other RPSs. Corresponding to Fig. 8 , Table 2 analyzes the impact of direct competition intensity of RPS 5. We can observe from Table 2 that the unit energy price of RPS 5 decreases as the competition intensity increases. This is in accordance with our intuition.
However, we can also see that the profit of RPS 5 increases as the competition intensity increases. This counter-intuitive outcome is due to the reason that RPS 5 will attract the operator to increase the energy quantity ordered from all the RPSs as their (individual) prices decrease. Specifically, the table shows that the storage level of RPS 5 increases from 4.4 kwh to 18.7 kwh as the competition intensity rises from 1 2.5 to 1 0.5 . As a result, the energy price of RPS 5 decreases from 1.5 to 1.2, and, the decrease in pricing power mitigates the negative externality outcomes exerted by all RPSs. Consequently, the increasing energy quantity will benefit all the other RPSs, and RPS 5 will ultimately benefit from the intense direct competition. Finally, more green have been stored for the system and the energy prices reduce as well, thus, the performance of the operator and the system will be also improved. C. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS FOR COOPERATIVE SCENARIO 1) COOPERATIVE SCENARIO VS. THE NON-COOPERATIVE SCENARIO Fig.6 illustrates the comparison between the RPS energy prices, the operator's service price and each RPS's profit between the non-cooperative system and the cooperative system. We fixed the total length of the backhaul to 1 km and increased the number of random-placed backhaul nodes along the backhaul. The total traffic amount is set to 720 Gbits. From Fig.6(a) , we can see that the energy price and service price increase as the backhaul nodes increase in number and achieve higher values for the cooperative scenario than that in the competitive scenario. For instance, for the backhaul with 10 nodes, the total energy price for the cooperative scenario is about 14 kcents, which is an increase of 6.5 kcents compared to the non-cooperative scenario. The hop distances could be close to each other as the density of the nodes along the backhaul increases. This results that the price in the cooperation solution approaches to the noncooperative solution. However, we can observe from the enlarged figure that, there is also a little difference between the price values when the backhaul nodes is 22. Note that, the cooperation manner is an always good solution compare with the non-cooperative manner, since the Nash stable coalition structure guarantees that a node in a coalition will not be strictly profitable if it acts independently. Fig.6(b) shows that the wireless traffic has a lower service price under the cooperative scheme. Consequently, a lower service price results in a higher traffic amount demand in the system. We can also observe from Fig.6(c) that the profits of the RPSs in the cooperative situation are always higher than in the competitive situation. The above analysis means that the cooperative collaborative pricing strategies can benefit each part of the system. Table 3 shows a comparison of an alliance's storage level under the centralized solution and the decentralized solution. We can see from the table that A 1 stores 16.9 kWh of energy in the centralized solution, whereas it stores 13.5 kWh of energy in the decentralized solution for forwarding the same amount of data traffic. Finally, Fig. 8 shows a comparison of the total system profit under the centralized solution and the decentralized solution with alliance formation. Set the backhual hops to 10. We can see from the figure that the system profit of the decentralized solution is 60.2 kcents, while the value of the centralized solution is 69.5 kcents. This implies that the proposed decentralized scheme is effective in terms of system profit. Note that the profit for the decentralized solution is slightly lower than that in the centralized solution, but the gap is small. Also, the gap is not always increasing with the number of hops. As Fig. 8 shows, the gap for a 26 hops backhual is a little smaller than a 18 hops backhaul. Because we examine a random backhaul topology, there is no regularity for those gap values. Fig. 9 compares the energy cost using the studied renewablepowered backhaul with that using conventional energy. Assume that, when the storage is depleted, the traffic will be lost. We also set a QoS cost of 0.01 cent punishment that is incurred to the operator if 1 Gbit of traffic is lost. On the other hand, for the backhaul using the conventional energy, all nodes will use the conventional energy to forward all wireless traffic; this may result in a larger energy cost, but no traffic will be lost. To forward 1 kGbit of data in a 10-hop backhaul using the cooperative strategy, we can see from the figure that the energy bill is reduced by approximately 85.2 kcents. Although such a value is seemingly small, this cost savings can be significant when a large number of small BSs are deployed. In addition, the lower use of power from the electric grid will reduce the overall CO 2 footprint of the wireless networks.
2) CENTRALIZED SOLUTION VS. DECENTRALIZED SOLUTION
D. ANALYSIS OF THE ENERGY SAVINGS GAIN AND THE QOS COST
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have provided a comprehensive study of a green cellular backhaul system which is powered by distributed micro grids and faces the price-sensitive end users. First, we presented a stylized model to capture both the direct competition in a micro grid and indirect competition among different nodes. By using a two-stage Stackelberg game formulation, we have identified the Stackelberg of the system and showed that the direct competition that one RPS faces helps improve the performance of the operator and all the other RPSs in the system, and surprisingly, it can help improve the performance of this particular RPS facing the competition as well. Furthermore, we have studied the cooperative scenario where each of the RPSs that provide renewable energy to the backhaul node may form coalitions to better coordinate their pricing decisions when they sell energy to the operator. By using the obtained result in the noncooperative case, we further have proved that, RPSs always prefer selling in groups in Nash equilibrium. Price coordination among RPSs via coalitions can be considered as a mean to reduce energy price, which further induces the operator to reduce its service price to increase sales from the end users. Furthermore, the results have also demonstrated that proposed decentralized scheme achieves a comparable system profit to the centralized solution. 
.
Thus, the amount of traffic to be served by the renewable energy isq
Then, the required energy storage q i is
whereẼ i is defined in (6) . Thus, we get that, i (
B. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
Based on equation (8), we find that
75808 VOLUME 6, 2018 First, note that there always exists a unique set of m and k such that 0 ≤ m < k ≤ n + 1. Given renewable energy prices of all the other RPSs, RPS i's best response is, by proposition 1,
,ˆi c}. We partition the suppliers into two subgroups: 1 = {1, 2, · · · , k − 1} and 2 = {k, · · · , n}. In addition, for an RPS i in each subgroup, we show that w * i is its best response energy price, given w * −i by all the other RPSs. First, we analyze the best response price of an RPS i in 1 , which is not empty if m ≥ 1. Given w j * =ĉ j for j = 1, 2, · · · , k −1, j = i, and w * j =c j + (C {k,n} + c 0 +
In the above derivational process, M = (C {i,n} + c 0 + C {1,i−1} ), where the first inequality is because c j ≥ c i for j = i + 1, · · · , k − 1; the second inequality follows since i ≤ n. Therefore, w * i =ĉ i is the best response price of RPS i. Next, we analyze the best response of RPS i in 2 , which is nonempty when k ≤ n. Given w * i =ĉ j for j {1, 2, · · · , k − 1} and w * i = c j + (C {k,n} + c 0 +
where the last inequality follows
) is the best response of RPS i.
D. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
The RPS's profit in equilibrium can be expressed as follows:
For RPS i, i [1, n] , letĉ i decrease, and consequently, it faces intensified direct competition. Letĉ i drop toĉ i − , > 0. This change will affect the value of k, which will increase by one or remain unchanged.
For the case of k increasing by one due to the decrease inĉ i , it must be true that i = k andĉ k − c k = (C {k,n} + c 0 + C {1,k−1} )/(R −1 − n + k − 1) so that for any > 0, we havê
After decreasingĉ i toĉ i − , all the other RPSs, except RPS i, will gain profits as
i ( ) will increase in at first but will decrease asĉ i −c i approaches zero.
For the case of k remaining unchanged asĉ i drops, if i [k, n], the profit of the RPSs will also remain unchanged; if i [1, k − 1], the profit of the RPSs can be expressed as
, and decreases in and the sign of
], N i ( ) will increase in , while when L(0) < 0, the profit will decrease in .
E. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4
This proposition is established because there are only two types of RPSs in alliance A: independent and nonindependent. In a Nash stable structure, these two types of RPSs prefer to maintain the present status rather than defect. Without loss of generality, we assume that A 1 ≤ · · · ≤ A m . Given a structure that at least has one independent RPS, with mean A 1 , we denote i as the only RPS in A 1 .
= A 2 + 1, i will not defect to join A 2 . For a structure with at least one non-independent RPS, we assume that RPSj earns the least profit, j A m , and its orig-
A m , will j not defect to become independent. U(m) stands for the ratio of the alliance's profit before and after some RPS defections.
When there is at least one non-independent RPS in an alliance, the RPSs will form a Nash stable alliance structure following the constraint U(m) ≥ A m ; thus, we can see that a smaller value of U(m) will make independent RPSs more likely to stay alone and non-independent RPSs defect to be independent. Consequently, the structures of the alliances will remain relatively small to be stable.
F. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5
For A = {A 1 , · · · , A m }, according to the operator's profit function o (p), the operator's optimal (p * , Q * ) depends on the total energy price of all RPSs. Each alliance chooses an energy price to maximize its own profit; therefore, the profit function A j must satisfy Given an alliance structure and a renewable energy price of RPSs, the operator determines p according to o = (p − W )Q(p) to maximize its profit, where the equation should satisfy 
